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Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, I am Mark Young, appearing on behalf of
the Futures Industry Association. FIA appreciates the opportunity to present its views to the
Committee on the pending legislation to address futures regulation and energy prices.
FIA regular member firms are registered with the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission as futures commission merchants (“FCMs”). FIA’s FCM member firms execute
customer orders for and provide the financial guarantees underwriting more than 90% of the
futures contracts traded on U.S. exchanges. FIA member firms also play a substantial role in
executing and clearing orders for customers world-wide in futures contracts traded on non-U.S.
exchanges. As the leading trade association for the U.S. futures industry, FIA and its member
firms have an acute interest in the many legislative proposals you are considering.
FIA has a long record with this Committee. We have supported every legislative reform
of futures regulation dating back to the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974 as
well as each Reauthorization of the CFTC since 1978. As in the past, FIA is committed to
working with this Committee on constructive legislation to modernize regulation and adapt to the
ever quickening pace of change in futures trading around the world.

While I suspect FIA, led by John Damgard, is well known to many members of this
Committee, I am sure I am not as well known. I am a partner in the law firm of Kirkland and
Ellis, LLP in the Washington, DC office. In 1977, I joined the CFTC’s legal staff when I
graduated from law school. I then moved to Kirkland in 1982. I have represented clients in
every CFTC reauthorization from 1978 to 2008. I now represent FIA on a variety of legislative,
litigation and regulatory matters. I represent other clients as well on a variety of regulatory and
litigation matters. I do not now represent any U.S. futures exchanges or foreign futures
exchanges. Also, since 1991, I have taught a course in Derivatives Regulation as an Adjunct
Professor at the Georgetown University Law Center.
FIA and its members have long believed that futures market price integrity is a
paramount concern. FIA does not support higher prices or lower prices on any market. FIA
does support having prices discovered openly and competitively on what the Commodity
Exchange Act calls, "liquid, fair and financially secure trading facilities."
In 1974, this Committee described the Commodity Exchange Act as a “comprehensive
regulatory structure to oversee the volatile and esoteric futures trading complex,” a description
the U.S. Supreme Court later called an “apt[] characteriz[ation].”1 Amending this complex
structure, under even the best of circumstances, can be a difficult challenge. FIA thanks this
Committee for your thorough and thoughtful approach to deliberating on the benefits and costs
of the many different legislative proposals before you.
FIA views each legislative proposal through the lens of seven basic principles.
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Merrill Lynch v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 355-356 (1982).
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1.
Futures trading serves the congressionally-endorsed national public interests in
commodity price risk management and commodity price discovery. Price manipulation robs
futures markets of their ability to serve those public interests.
2.
The Commodity Futures Trading Commission now has vast powers to prevent price
manipulation, ranging from position limits and vigorous enforcement actions to transparent
market surveillance and emergency powers . The CFTC is an effective agency; it needs
additional resources more than it needs additional powers.
3.
Speculators are essential for futures markets, as the Supreme Court and many
commentators have found.2 Without speculators, U.S. futures markets would not serve the
national public interest. Speculation is not price manipulation. Those who claim it is would
also equate oxygen with air pollution.
4.
Congress should not enact legislation that would create disincentives for futures business
to be conducted through U.S. firms and on U.S. markets, which could cost U.S. jobs. Congress
should also not enact legislation that would hinder the CFTC’s market oversight and price
transparency.
5.
The forces of globalization and technological innovation are linking economic and
financial activities world-wide more every day. No legislation could repeal that market reality.
6.
Loopholes are a misnomer. Congress made many deliberate and realistic policy choices
from 1982 to 2000, many of which originated in this Committee. Each was intended to serve the
public interest, not any special interest. Those choices have served the public interest well,
resulting in strong growth, more transparency and less financial risk in U.S. derivatives markets.
7.
The CFTC’s legal authority over U.S. futures exchanges, traders and firms is and must be
greater and more direct than its legal authority over foreign futures exchanges, traders and firms.
International cooperation and coordination is therefore an essential component of effective
market surveillance for global markets.
Along with other financial services trade associations, FIA has provided a list of
measures Congress should enact to deal with the current market situation . Those
2

Merrill Lynch v. Curran, 456 U.S. at 390 (speculators play a “crucial role in an effective and orderly
futures market”); Economist, “Don’t blame the Speculators,” July 5-11, (at.15-16 (“speculators provide a vital
service”); Robert Samuelson, ”Lets Shoot the Speculators,” Newsweek, July 7-14, 2008 (“What makes the futures
markets work is the large number of purely financial players—"speculators" just in it for the money—who often
take the other side of hedgers' trades.”); Richard W. Rahn, “Greedy Speculators,” Washington Times, June 25, 2008
at A22 (“There are many...market speculators who provide liquidity to the market and fill the void if the numbers of
short and long hedgers do not match up.”); J. Nocera, “Easy Target, But Not The Right One,” New York Times,
June 28, 2008 at B1.
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recommendations are included as Appendix A. For this hearing, the Committee has grouped the
issues presented in the pending legislative proposals into six categories. FIA’s thoughts on each
area follow. We emphasize the foreign board of trade issue because it is the primary area of
concern to the clearing firms that comprise our core membership.
FOREIGN BOARDS OF TRADE
Background
In 1982, Congress determined that futures contracts traded on an exchange “located
outside the U.S.” -- called a “foreign board of trade” -- would be excused from the requirement
that futures contracts in the U.S. must be traded on a CFTC-approved exchange. That
requirement remains the law today unless a statutory or regulatory exclusion or exemption is
applicable. In 1982, Congress also specified that the CFTC could not directly regulate foreign
boards of trade or their operations. For well over a decade, this provision was non-controversial
and applied in a legally certain atmosphere: an exchange was considered to be “located” where
its trading floor was located and U.S. customers accessed foreign boards of trade without
incident.
In recent years, matching engines, trading terminals, servers and web access allowed any
exchange anywhere in the world to access U.S. customers directly. Because issues were raised
about whether these developments affected where an exchange was “located,” the CFTC and its
staff developed a no-action approach. Through the no-action process, the CFTC was able to
condition the ability of a foreign board of trade to conduct business with firms and customers in
the U.S. One important condition is the level of cooperation the CFTC could receive from a
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foreign board of trade’s foreign regulator, what the CEA defines as a “foreign futures authority.”
To date, the CFTC’s web-site lists 20 of these no-action letters issued to foreign boards of trade.
As commodity markets have become more international in scope and electronic trade
execution mechanisms have become predominant, U.S. and foreign exchanges have begun some
level of direct competition. U.S. futures exchanges have attempted to engage in direct
competition with certain foreign futures exchanges and foreign exchanges have attempted to
engage in direct competition with certain U.S. exchanges. For example, in recent years the
Chicago Board of Trade offered replicas of the German Bund, Bobl and Shatz futures contracts
which trade successfully on EUREX, the German-Swiss Exchange. The New York Mercantile
Exchange also trades a Brent Oil futures contract which is a cash-settled version of the same
contract which first traded on what is now ICE Futures Europe. Competition is a two way street.
ICE Futures Europe also has listed and trades a cash-settled clone of the bellwether WTI crude
oil futures contract traded at NYMEX.
FIA strongly supports direct competition among trading facilities both within the U.S and
globally. Competition leads to more liquidity, lower trading costs, tighter spreads, and more
innovation. It does, however, complicate market surveillance. It is easier to know who is trading
what futures contracts on one exchange, than on multiple exchanges. It is also easier for a single
dominant designated contract market to discharge its statutory duty to prevent manipulation on
its own market without having to worry about trading in the same commodity on the market of
its competitor, the “challenger” exchange. The CFTC has determined that direct competition is
important to promote and that the agency itself will bridge the gap in market surveillance among
different exchanges trading the same product when these instances of direct competition arise.
FIA has endorsed the CFTC’s determination and actions to promote exchange competition.
5

Competition does promote innovation. For example, in response to the ICE Futures
Europe decision to list a NYMEX-replica WTI crude oil futures contract and the immediate
success ICE experienced through electronic trading in a contract that previously could only be
traded on the NYMEX trading floor, NYMEX accelerated its efforts to allow electronic trading
for its WTI contract. In response, the CFTC has taken a number of pro-active steps, with the
cooperation of ICE’s regulator, the UK Financial Services Authority, to make sure that the
CFTC’s market surveillance picture for both markets is clear and transparent. Again, FIA
endorses the measures the CFTC has implemented and commends the agency for its leadership
and initiative.
Current Proposals
We understand that many want to codify in the CEA the CFTC’s market surveillance
protocols where a foreign-based and regulated exchange attempts to compete with a U.S.
exchange for market share in a particular futures contract. FIA supports that goal. Competition
should not compromise market surveillance. When two exchanges, no matter where located,
compete for trading volume in the same product, the CFTC has heightened market surveillance
responsibilities and its traditional market surveillance tools need to be adjusted to make sure that
the CFTC has any and all data to prevent price manipulation or other major market disturbances.
As this Committee understands well, with most CEA proposals it is particularly
important to target the legislative language to address the specific problem at issue and to avoid
triggering legal and business consequences that would undermine the intended policy goal or
have other unintended repercussions. In this instance, it is essential that any proposal adopted by
the Committee not unintentionally harm the CFTC’s efforts to enhance its surveillance
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capabilities by pushing more market activity to less transparent venues where the trading data the
CFTC may need would not be readily available.
FIA has reviewed the pending proposals and our list of concerns with each proposal is
found at Appendex B to this testimony. Overall, FIA fears that the proposals in the FBOT
area that have been introduced to date would inadvertently harm both the CFTC’s ability
to prevent manipulation and the competitiveness of U.S. brokerage firms, while potentially
leading to trade-war type retaliation from foreign governments against U.S. exchanges.
Some of these proposals are drafted in a circular manner so that only foreign exchanges
otherwise excused from CFTC oversight by statute would be subject to the heightened
surveillance requirements. Other proposals enable FBOTs to evade the contemplated mandated
CFTC regulation of FBOT self-regulatory operations by simply refusing to deal with U.S. traders
and firms, while welcoming the business of any overseas affiliates of these same traders and
firms. This has happened before in the context of security futures products and other trading
instruments. In fact, some U.S. clearing firms have moved or may be compelled to move their
operational and processing facilities out of the U.S. for just this reason. The results? No direct
CFTC transparency for these FBOT trades, leading to increased manipulation risk and increased
systemic financial risk on the clearing side, and a weakened business base for U.S. traders and
firms (which creates a disincentive to even start such a business in the U.S.).
FIA also believes that any legislation in this area should be symmetrical because
competition is global and U.S. exchanges do try to wrest market share from foreign boards of
trade in various products, a competitive trend we hope will continue. Foreign futures authorities
have as much interest in preventing price manipulation in their jurisdictions as the CFTC does
here.

None of the introduced proposals addresses this market and regulatory reality.
7

As mentioned earlier, FIA shares the policy goals of many of the introduced FBOT
proposals: to enhance CFTC surveillance where warranted to deal with competition among
foreign and U.S. exchanges in energy futures trading and to prevent market manipulation. To
achieve those objectives, FIA recommends that the Committee consider the following type of
provision:
When a foreign board of trade lists for trading an energy futures
contract that is linked to the settlement price of an energy futures
contract trading on a U.S. futures exchange (or vice versa) and
when the CFTC (or its foreign regulatory counterpart) believes
enhanced market surveillance is necessary or appropriate, then the
CFTC and its foreign counterpart should immediately consult on,
develop and implement heightened surveillance measures to
prevent price manipulation and ensure transparent, coordinated
market surveillance.
This approach will not only codify and strengthen the process and procedures the CFTC already
has implemented with respect to ICE Futures Europe and its coordinated efforts with the FSA, it
would build upon the CFTC leadership in this area to promote international consultation and
coordinated regulatory responses. We would be leading the world in a common and important
mission -- the prevention of price manipulation any time, anywhere. We would not be telling
the world how that mission must be accomplished or that every CFTC or U.S. exchange
requirement must be replicated in every instance. We would be leading, not dictating.
FIA also is very concerned that some legislative proposals in the FBOT area would
operate to impose prohibitions on U.S futures commission merchant firms that accept and
execute customer orders on FBOTs. Unintentionally and inadvertently, these proposals would
make U.S. firms liable if an FBOT fails to comply with U.S. law. They could also be read to
allow customers to sue U.S. firms to void or rescind foreign futures contracts if the FBOT fails to
comply with the CFTC-imposed regulatory conditions. When executing and clearing orders
8

for U.S. or foreign customers, U.S. FCMs should not be guaranteeing the regulatory
compliance of FBOTs. Specific statutory safe harbors and exemptions are needed to prevent
CFTC-registered professionals from bearing the legal risk of FBOT non-compliance. Otherwise
investment banks and other clearing firms will simply and sensibly decide to run their futures
brokerage and clearing businesses through overseas affiliates to avoid that potential liability.
The foreign board of trade issue is vitally important to the future commercial viability of
the U.S. FCM community which comprises the core of the FIA’s membership. We would be
happy to consult with the Committee and its staff on specific legislative language to achieve the
objectives of much of the FBOT legislation proposed to date without the adverse consequences
outlined above.
Swaps: Treating Energy Commodities Like Agricultural Commodities
Under the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Congress prescribed different
levels of CFTC oversight and regulation for different trading systems, different market
participants and different commodities. Generally, Congress determined that trading on
multilateral trading facilities, where many market participants may execute trades with other
market participants (so-called “many to many” markets), replicated the trading structure of
traditional futures trading pits and should not be excused from CFTC regulation. Also trading
among only Eligible Contract Participants, essentially well-capitalized, sophisticated or regulated
entities, might not require full CFTC regulation and oversight because each ECP would be
capable of protecting itself. And transactions in financial, energy and metals commodities did
not implicate the same historical CEA regulatory concerns about market manipulation as did
futures on agricultural commodities, which are the only commodities subject to CFTC-set
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speculative limits for futures trading on an exchange. Building on those concepts, Congress
extended legal certainty to non-agricultural commodity transactions among ECPs by excluding
or exempting those transactions from the CEA when the transactions were not executed on a
trading facility.3
Agricultural options and swaps transactions, however, may still be exempted from the
CEA’s exchange-trading requirement, among other regulatory provisions, under a CFTC
exemption found in Part 35 of its Rulebook and adopted under Section 4(c) of the CEA, as
enacted in 1992. Under the Part 35 rules, non-standardized and non-fungible derivatives
transactions among Eligible Swap Participants (again, well-capitalized, sophisticated parties) are
generally exempt from the CEA unless traded on a multilateral transaction execution facility or
submitted to a futures-style clearing system. These otherwise exempt agricultural transactions are
still subject to the CEA’s anti-fraud and anti-manipulation prohibitions.
The CFMA exemptions and exclusions in the energy area represented an attempt
statutorily to increase price transparency and remove systemic financial risk in over-the-counter
energy transactions. And those provisions have worked as intended. ICE and other market
innovators have developed methods of increasing price transparency for energy swaps in less
than fully multilateral electronic trading systems. It is uncertain whether those swaps would be
eligible for exemption under Part 35. What is certain is that none of those energy swaps could be
subject to a futures-style clearing system unless the CFTC adopted a new exemption. Treating

3

This summary oversimplifies the web of CEA exclusions and exemptions enacted in 2000. But it captures the
essence of CEA §§ 2(c), 2(d), 2(e), 2(g) and 2(h). Notably, parties engaged in exempt transactions in energy
commodities under section 2(h) could still be subject to CFTC prosecution for energy price manipulation.
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energy commodity swaps like agricultural commodity swaps therefore would likely diminish
price transparency and increase financial risk for these transactions.
In the 2008 Farm Bill, Congress addressed the legitimate concern that exempt energy
transactions under Section 2(h) that are traded electronically and develop into significant price
discovery transactions should be regulated more like futures contracts than Congress envisioned
in 2000. Once full implemented by the CFTC, this reform will enhance price transparency and
market oversight. Its valuable benefits will be lost, however, if energy commodities are treated
in the same ways as agricultural commodities and removed from the transactions eligible for
exemption under Section 2(h)(3) of the CEA. Like most quick fixes under the CEA, equating
energy commodities with agricultural commodities will disserve the public interest. FIA would
not recommend its adoption or the approval of any substantive amendments to CEA §§ 2(g) and
2(h). Instead, the reforms in the Farm Bill should be allowed to take full effect and monitored to
determine whether any adjustment is warranted in the near future.
Resources for the CFTC
FIA strongly supports the proposals for additional resources for the CFTC, including at
least 100 new CFTC employees. Those numbers are commensurate with the CFTC’s scope of
responsibilities and ever expanding authority in a global and changing market place.

The bulk

of the CFTC’s new resources we would expect to be used to hire attorneys in the Enforcement
Division to investigate and root out any alleged price manipulations the CFTC staff may
uncover. Manipulation should not be tolerated and enforcement actions for past misconduct are
the best means to deter future misconduct.
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Pension Funds and Index Trading
FIA strongly opposes banning any collective investment vehicles, whether they are
pension funds, mutual funds, commodity funds or hedge funds, from participating in futures
markets. When the funds’ professional trading managers determine it is in the best interests of
the funds’ investors or beneficiaries to diversify their portfolio by trading in futures markets, that
new speculative capital and liquidity should not be shunned. The CFTC is wisely investigating
to determine whether index traders or any one else has engaged in price manipulation. FIA has
every confidence that the CFTC (along with staff from other, less directly interested, federal
agencies) will analyze the right data and will make public its conclusions on or about September
15, 2008. FIA will be interested to evaluate the Commission’s analysis under that accelerated
time table. Until the facts are known and analyzed, however, FIA would urge all interested
parties not to pre-judge the price effects of index trading, swap dealer net offsets in futures or
pension fund activities.
Speculative Limits
Some observers believe that swap dealers should not be considered to be hedgers when
they enter into futures market transactions to offset the price risk of their swap transactions with
non-physical commodity counterparties. To the extent the CFTC study will consider this issue,
FIA would withhold final judgment. But it seems to make no difference from the perspective of
the swap dealer whether its futures position is designed to manage a price risk incurred with a
physical counterparty or a financial counterparty. Price risk is price risk. Swap dealers in energy
commodities use futures to reduce their net market price risk on transactions with financial and
physical counterparties. If a swap dealer entered into a long swap transaction in crude oil with a
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notional amount equal to10 futures contracts with a financial counterparty and then entered into a
short swap transaction in crude oil with a notional amount equal to 5 futures contracts with a
physical counterparty, the dealer could then go short 5 crude oil futures contracts on NYMEX to
manage its net outstanding price risk. Some proposals would disallow treating the dealer’s 5
short futures position as a hedge; instead those proposals would insist the dealer has a 5 short
speculative position in futures, a result which distorts both the economic reality of the swap
dealer’s risk and any CFTC surveillance of that position. That approach also could make it more
costly for the dealer to margin its futures position (a cost the dealer would likely pass along to its
swaps counterparties).
The better way to handle this situation is to allow the CFTC as well as the NYMEX and
other exchanges to establish position accountability standards and to look behind the positions
when appropriate to see whether the swap dealers or other large traders are engaged in any
transactions that would raise surveillance concerns, without worrying about the classification of
a position as hedge or speculative. Current law and DCM core principles accomplish that kind
of flexibility. Indeed, under NYMEX rules, the hedge vs. speculation classification only really
matters for position limit purposes during the last three trading days in every contract when
speculative position limits first become applicable.
Margin
U.S. futures exchanges should set margins, not the U.S. government. Exchanges and
their clearing entities set margins to balance credit risk considerations against other market
interests. It is a delicate business judgment that goes to the heart of exchange operations and
should be left to the exchanges. In the context of crude oil prices, there is no evidence that
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NYMEX has abdicated its authority in any way in this area. To the contrary, from January 2,
2007 through July 3, 2008, NYMEX has increased its margin for WTI crude oil futures for nonmember speculators by about 270% in absolute terms and about 50% when compared to the
notional amount per contract.
Conclusion
Record high gasoline prices are creating challenges and hardships in our national and
international economy. If FIA believed that some reform to futures regulatory surveillance
practices would reduce those challenges and hardships, we would not hesitate to recommend
those reforms. But FIA is not aware of any proposed change to the CEA that is likely to result
quickly, automatically and permanently in a decline in the price of crude oil. We are aware of
statutory proposals that would substantially and adversely affect U.S. futures firms and markets,
price transparency, systemic risk, and competition. These proposals threaten the viability of
many services our member firms now provide to customers in the U.S. and overseas. Those
proposals should not be adopted by this Committee and Congress.
FIA respectfully requests that the Committee continue to proceed with caution in
considering the pending proposals. We look forward to working with the Committee and its staff
to fashion meaningful, realistic and targeted legislation to enhance market surveillance for
energy futures markets and to strengthen the CFTC’s regulatory muscle over the ever changing
dynamic of futures trading activities.
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APPENDIX A

WHAT CONGRESS SHOULD DO
•

Congress should call on the President to immediately send a request for emergency
appropriations to allow the CFTC to increase oversight, improve the Commission’s
information technology, and hire at least 100 new full time employees.

•

Congress should instruct the Commission to add at least 100 new full time employees
in order to increase surveillance of the market, improve enforcement and otherwise
carry out the purposes of the Act.

•

Congress should require the CFTC to obtain all necessary market surveillance
information to prevent market manipulation.

•

Congress should require the CFTC to report to Congress regarding the effectiveness
of its expanded information-sharing arrangement with the FSA, and the results of its
review of the scope of commodity index trading in the futures market, and its
recommendations for any changes to its authority or rules, including any
modifications to the Commitment of Traders reports as necessary to provide
increased transparency in energy derivative markets.

•

Congress should instruct the Commission to undertake a comprehensive report, in
conjunction with other futures and options regulators world-wide, relating to
differences in regulatory regimes worldwide as well as the role of institutional
investors, speculators and other participants in the markets.
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Appendix B
Futures Industry Association -- Concerns Relating to Foreign Board of
Trade (“FBOT”) Legislative Proposals
1.

1

HR 6284 (Mattheson), HR 6334 (Etheridge), S2995 (Levin),
S3044(Reid), S3129 (Levin), S3130 (Durbin) -- CFTC may grant
§ 4(a) relief only for FBOT with comparable regulation and willing
to submit trading data to CFTC
(a)

“Located outside.” Applies only to foreign boards of trade
which, by definition, are located outside the U.S. and
therefore do not need § 4(a) relief. Because FBOTs need no
§ 4(a) relief the provision is ineffective and self-defeating.

(b)

“Cash-settled.” Applies only to FBOTs “with respect to an
energy commodity that is physically delivered in the U.S.”
FBOT contracts that are cash-settled would not be covered by
the provision. ICE Futures Europe’s WTI futures contract is
cash-settled and does not call for physical delivery of any
energy commodity.1

(c)

Attempts to impose direct CFTC regulation on FBOTs in a
number of areas. In response and to avoid duplicative
regulatory oversight, FBOTs are likely to close off foreign
markets from U.S. market participants and firms. FBOTs
will simply refuse to take orders from US firms and traders.
FBOT business may not suffer; firms and traders will

HR 6349 (Marshall) is substantially similar to the six enumerated bills except it does not have the physical
delivery limitation. It would apply if an FBOT’s energy contract refers to the price of a physically delivered
energy contract traded on a US exchange and the contract contemplates a “primary physical delivery point” in
the U.S. This formulation would allow CFTC regulation to apply to FBOT contracts that are cash-settled,
although the concept of a primary US delivery point is not well established and may not be easy to apply in all
circumstances. Other than cash-settlement, HR 6349 raises all of the same issues as the six other bills listed.

continue to trade on the FBOT, but will trade through their
overseas affiliates.

2.

(d)

If FBOTs are made subject to affirmative US statutory
requirements, US FCM firms could be liable under § 4(a) for
an FBOT’s non-compliance because of the way § 4(a) is
structured. FCMs should not be insuring FBOT compliance
with US law.

(e)

No coordination role provided for foreign futures authority
with jurisdiction over the FBOT.

HR 6341 (Van Hollen) -- Disqualifies boards of trade from being
considered to be foreign if they have US ties and trade SPDCs in
energy.
(a)

Harms CFTC Surveillance Transparency. Any FBOT could
avoid US jurisdiction by not affiliating with an entity in the
US or not having any infrastructure in US. FBOTs could set
up matching engines outside the US, with servers outside the
US and no direct US presence. FBOTs would not need any
CFTC relief. CFTC would lose all possible leverage in
trying to obtain surveillance information.

(b)

If CFTC determines an exchange with US ties trades a
Significant Price Discovery Contract (a new statutory term
designed to serve a very different purpose) in any energy
commodity, then that contract becomes illegal to trade in the
US unless the FBOT becomes a DCM. Making illegal a
contract that others are using for price discovery -theoretically world-wide -- will harm the price discovery
process and may cause serious commercial harm in the
energy markets.

(c)

It is unclear how to apply the SPDC criteria from the Farm
Bill to an international market. The SPDC criteria were
developed to discern price discovery contracts in the U.S.,
17

not in overseas markets. Is the CFTC supposed to make a
national or international SPDC determination?

3.

4.

(d)

Would encourage foreign exchanges to bar US traders and
firms from participating in their markets. Congress may
want US parties to participate in energy price discovery
rather than leave price discovery just to parties in the Middle
East and other parts of the world.

(e)

Requires ICE Futures Europe to become a US designated
contract market. Could spark trade-war style retaliation.

HR 6330 (Stupak) -- Makes illegal non-DCM energy futures if
delivery point in US or “transacted” on a terminal in US.
(a)

Would not apply to cash-settled transactions on an FBOT.

(b)

Exchanges now rely less on dedicated terminals for trading.
Modern technology and web-access make trading easier to
access from anywhere in the world. FBOT do not need to
have terminals in the US. If FBOTs don’t have terminals in
the US, the CEA doesn’t apply to those FBOTs’ contracts.

(c)

Excuses an energy contract from coverage under the CEA
unless it calls for delivery point in the US or is transacted on
a US terminal. An FBOT could list a cash-settled energy
contract and allow US traders access from web-sites in the
US and not be subject to the CEA. May actually cut back on
CFTC authority, making transparency and market
surveillance harder to achieve.

(d)

Misapprehends that CFTC FBOT no-actions have relied on
Section 4(c) exemptions (which bill seeks to nullify absent
public comment). No-actions are not 4(c) exemptions.

HR 6130 (Barton) -- Requires CFTC within 6 months to determine
whether to adopt a rule regarding how the CFTC determines a
18

foreign futures authority regulates its exchanges and markets in a
way comparable to the CFTC.

5.

6.

(a)

Developing regulatory standards for determining
comparability in different regulatory structures may limit
CFTC discretion. But providing notice to market participants
and FBOTs of the factors the CFTC would take into account
in making a comparability determination may not be
problematic.

(b)

May remove CFTC flexibility by requiring FBOTs to have
certain specific regulatory tools to achieve comparability.
Better approach would be to determine whether antimanipulation protections are adequate and how well sharing
of surveillance data on competing contracts could work.

HR 6279 (Chabot) -- Same as bills covered under Part I above,
but adds that FBOT margin requirements must be comparable to
US and “sufficient to reduce excessive speculation.”
(a)

DCMs in US have considerable flexibility in imposing
margin, as they should. They operate under core principles
subject to CFTC oversight.

(b)

Under US law, margin is not generally designed to curb
excessive speculation. Margin is largely a credit risk issue.
FBOTs should not be held to a different, higher standard.

HR 6372 (Hill) -- No board of trade may be an FBOT if it has a
US affiliate, trades a commodity other than an exempt commodity
or trades a significant price discovery contract.
(a)

No “US affiliate” test artificially restricts cross-border
exchange mergers with US entities. Why limit the
commercial maneuverability of US trading facilities when
foreign counterparts are not similarly restricted? Also allows
board of trade a fairly painless way to evade U.S. law.
19

7.

(b)

Energy and metals are exempt commodities. Trading in
those kinds of commodities would be not be affected by this
bill. Trading in agricultural commodities and financial
commodities (excluded commodities) like interest rates,
currencies and equities would be affected. Not sure that was
intent.

(c)

SPDC determination in Farm Bill was not developed with
foreign or global markets in mind. Not sure how well SPDC
determination can be adapted to this context. Also SPDC is
not self-executing; it requires an affirmative CFTC
determination. Why would Congress want to make it illegal
to trade a contract that businesses are relying on for
significant price discovery.

S3122 (Cantwell) -- Makes into a DCM any trading facility that a)
“operates 1 or more trading terminals” in US; b) trades contracts
that serve a price discovery function for a commodity delivered in
the US and c) is regulated by a foreign regulatory agency.
Terminates existing exemptions from DCM registration.
(a)

FBOTs today operate under a CFTC-approved no-action
process, not Section 4(c) exemptions.

(b)

FBOTs do not need to operate “trading terminals” in the US.
Web access is world-wide. Also servers that facilitate the
pace of execution of US customer orders on FBOTs are not
considered to be trading terminals. Servers are not trading
terminals.

(c)

Price discovery function is an undefined, new term. To the
extent it is different than the “significant price discovery
contract” definition from the 2008 Farm Bill, it is not clear
why a new phrase is needed. To the extent it is the same as
the Farm Bill formulation, it is not self-executing, adds
administrative cost to CFTC regulation, and may not be
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applicable to energy markets traded overseas. Also has the
perverse consequence of penalizing a foreign exchange for
developing an energy contract (Brent) which a US exchange
later copies.
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